I was prompted to write this entry by two things, first Suarez’s (2026) WPR application targeting “problematisations and reproblematisations in the making of formal mental health care in Chile”, with its questioning of “expertise” (discussed later), and second, by the commonly identified “core elements” in “populism” as “pitting the people in moral battle against elites” (Meyer 2023, p. 847). I wanted to ask if there were any connections between these propositions. Anticipating the argument, I ask: does a WPR position on expertise provide fuel for the fire of “populist” anti-elitism? This topic takes us down some unexpected but interesting pathways.

The topic allows us to pursue two theoretical positions introduced in the first of three entries on “populism” (29 August 2026). There, I raise questions about the limitations imposed by definitions in approaching “populism”. On that matter, I refer to Mol’s (2010) argument that definitions set constraints on understanding, that when you define something, you are henceforth compelled to see only what matches that definition. Second, there is the conviction that our selection of “methods” matters, that they have political effects (Mol 2002). I decided to ask: what are the political repercussions of defining “populism” as reflecting a tension between “the people” and “elites”? Put briefly: what do we miss by imposing a definition on “populism” that sets “the people” against “elites”?

Limitations of the “people” versus “elite” dichotomy

Sunnercrantz (2024, p. 551) raises a similar question in her comments on the operation of a “people” versus “the expert” dichotomy in understandings of “populism”. She points out that this characterisation of “populism” ignores the operation of similar contrasts in settings that would not be called “populist”.

“Media has often ‘ditched the (academic) expert for “the man in the street”’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 108) and traditional politicians often allude to the lived experience of ‘common people’ (Atkins and Finlayson 2013).”

As Andor (2020, p. 24) notes, “even green and liberal parties in developing countries occasionally employ this rhetoric to combat entrenched elite corruption”. When you think about it, democracy itself invokes a form of “people” versus “corrupt” elements. Does that make adherents of democracy “populists”? I suspect not.

According to Sunnercrantz (2024, p. 551),

“It is debatable whether the opposition between a ‘people’ and ‘the expert’ is an intrinsic component of populism, as the uses of ‘experts’ vary between populist projects (see e.g. Bellolio 2022; Sunnercrantz and Yildirim 2022).”

From her study of political positions during the COVID-19 pandemic, Sunnercrantiz (2024, p. 555) offers some useful examples that complicate the dichotomy. She notes that “During the pandemic, many parties labelled as populist, when in positions of power, supported scientific elites and experts”. In Hungary, then Prime Minister Victor Orbán “publicly embraced expert advice and asserted that he was ‘no expert’ – despite relinquishing neither control nor media attention to ‘the expert’.”

Sunnercrantiz’s (2024, p. 554) post-foundational analysis “recognizes ‘the expert’ as a discursive, contextual practice or performance, rather than an individual possessing a certain experience or skill (Evetts et al. 2006; Fischer 2000)”. While she recognises that “populism is often said to valorize ‘common sense’ and ‘folk wisdom’”, this “does not necessarily imply an opposition to “experts” or “expertise” (Sunnercrantiz 2024, p. 560). Indeed, she believes that researchers who accept a people/elite dichotomy, “construct and reaffirm ‘the gap’ between experiential and scientific expertise”. In effect, she suggests, excluding the “popular masses” from the elite “might even be perceived as elitist, or anti-populist” (see Voutyras 2024).

Effects of the “people” versus “elites” dichotomy

In the first Research Hub entry on “populism” (29 August 2026) I draw attention to some of the political effects accompanying specific uses of “populism”. I stress the way in which the “false equivalence” between “right-wing” and “left-wing” populism tends to make insurgent politics of all kinds illegitimate. The flipside of this repercussion involves a “taming” of political action and a privileging of consensus. Voutyras (2024, p. 37) identifies a similar effect in what he calls the “horseshoe theory”, in which the two “extremes” are deemed to be similar by virtue of being “extremes”:

“The operation of this as a delegitimizing tactic is clear: since everyone else is labelled as ‘populist’, liberal anti-populists can effectively claim that there is no alternative to the centrist line – at least not a legitimate one (Rancière 2017).”

Meyer (2024) has another target in mind in his questioning of the people/elite dichotomy. He notes that “Scholars in both political science and science and technology studies (STS) often characterize populism as equating experts with ‘elites’ who are attacked in the name of ‘the people’.” The strength of this association, he argues, leads to the argument that “populism” is a key obstacle to climate change and to governing in pluralistic and democratic ways. Meyer counters this view by highlighting the role of other forms of knowledge, characterised as counterknowledge, within “science-related populism” (see below).

According to Meyer (2024), “it is important to consider challenges to the sovereignty of science with our eyes open”:

“In discussing science in relation to populism, Mette Marie Roslyng (2022: 212) notes that ‘debates about truth versus falsity are replaced by political struggles over who gets to define hegemonic science and knowledge’”.

The people/elite dichotomy leaves the impression that “populism” is simply “anti-science” whereas we need to “avoid the trap of anti-populist discourses that reify a vision of science and scientific advice that is dangerously misleading”.  Davies (2020) reinforces this view: “Science must abandon its claim to be politically autonomous, without this generating a wholesale legitimacy crisis for scientific expertise, of the sort that many populists seek to exploit.” Does “populism” cause a “legitimacy crisis” for science? Let’s see what our “experts” have to say.

Science and “populism”

Concerns about the relationship between “science” and “society” have a long history. So too do debates about the kind of “knowledge” science produces. Unsurprisingly, therefore, you can expect a large literature on the challenges “populism” poses for scientists. Two authors, Harry Collins and Robert Evans, have written extensively on the topic. Their publications provide an introduction to the controversies generated in the field (Collins and Evans 2002; Collins, Evans, Durant and Weinel 2020; Collins et al. 2023).

Collins and Evans identify three “waves” in the debates surrounding the nature of scientific evidence. The First Wave occurred pre 1970 and accepted an objectivist or positivist view (see entry 28 September 2026). The 1970s Second Wave was fraught with contention stimulated by STS (Science and Technology Studies) and SSK (sociology of scientific knowledge), which focused on science as a “social activity from which ideas of truth emerged via social agreement among scientists” (Collins et al., 2023, p. 53). Exchanges, dubbed the “science wars”, became heated due to concerns about climate denialism that purportedly accompanied this questioning of scientific objectivity. Bruno Latour, solidly located as a leading Second Wave theorist, famously abandoned his stance due to fear of a “legitimacy crisis” for scientific expertise (Bacchi 2026, pp. 162-163; see above).

Collins, also self-proclaimed as a Second Wave theorist, saw the need for a Third “Wave”, which continues to be the centre of contention. Basically, the “Third Wave” seeks to establish a special status for scientific knowledge without falling back into objectivism. There is a fear that the distinction between “experts” and “non experts” will disappear (Collins et al. 2023). To establish a legitimate status for “experts”, Collins refers to “specialist abilities”. The group associated with this new position (Third Wave) call themselves SEE (Studies of Expertise and Experience), which “replaces veritism with the idea that experts are people who have been socialized into an expert domain”.

The 2020 publication, titled Experts and the Will of the People (Collins et al., Palgrave Macmillan), indicates that the “science wars” are ongoing. The authors deserve to be quoted at length since they spell out their Third Wave stance clearly and how they position “populism” and STS:

“The rise of populism in the West has led to attacks on scientific expertise. We explain populism through its contrast with pluralist democracy and explain why populists attack scientific expertise. Populism treats the losers at the ballot box and anyone who stands in the way of the government, including scientific experts, as traitors. In contrast, pluralist democracy accommodates minority views by limiting the power of government with ‘checks and balances’. Contemporary science and technology studies (STS) erodes the cultural importance of scientific expertise and unwittingly supports the rise of populism. STS must re-think the justification of scientific expertise and its role in society without sacrificing its deep insights into the social nature of science; it should no longer simply celebrate the erosion of science’s cultural pre-eminence. (Collins et al. 2020, Chapter 1 Abstract; emphasis added)”.

In Collins et al., therefore, “populism” is equated with “anti-elitism” and is considered a threat to democratic traditions. Also clear is the questioning of the social studies of science position (STS), which is associated with post-foundational modes of inquiry (see 28 Sept 2026). Critics of the Third Wave argue that the framework is too technocratic (top down rather than bottom up), that it limits democratic participation and risks devaluing “lay” expertise.

As Davies (2020) points out, “many commentators claim to have spotted a thread linking ‘postmodern’ critique and contemporary populist rhetoric, in as much as both treat ‘facts’ as political constructs”. Caudill (2020) notes that “STS” can “easily be weaponized by the populist right wing in US politics”. And so we have arrived at the tricky spot I anticipated earlier, considering if the kind of analysis associated with poststructuralist theories plays into the hands of “populists” and, if this is the case, whether it may (or may not) be necessary to follow Latour and rethink our arguments.

Expertise in WPR: Suarez (2026) and welfare

You may recall that I started these reflections with a question about the possible relationship between WPR and “populism” through “expertise”. I asked: “Does a WPR position on expertise provide fuel for the fire of ‘populist’ anti-elitism?” I could think of no better way to tackle this question than to consider how Suarez (2026) uses WPR to examine the problematisations in mental health care in Chile.

Suarez produces a genealogical analysis of developments in Chilean mental health care (MHC). WPR is used “flexibly to scrutinize and interrogate problem representations within Chile’s MHC system over time” (Suarez 2026, p. 4). The expressed goal is to illuminate how

“top-down authoritative policy problematisations endorse particular ways of understanding and responding to mental illness, while simultaneously rendering alternative framings less visible or untenable”. (p. 4)

Usefully, Suarez suggests that this analytic strategy “brings into dialogue the conceptual (macro), institutional (meso), and interaction (micro) levels of medicalisation”. It also allows “political, normative and epistemological frameworks, institutions, key actors and medical practices to be analysed as intersecting dynamic dimensions that both shape MHC provision and configure people’s subjectivities”. Finally, Suarez recognised that such an approach also “foregrounds the broader social effects” of healthcare policies (p. 4).

I have provided this detailed description of Suarez’s approach to indicate the perils of simplistically summarizing his analysis and findings. This short entry aims to extract from his useful article comments relevant to the topic of “expertise”. I recommend reading the entire article to grasp fully the development of the argument.

Through the long history of psychiatric hospital care to more community-based approaches, Suarez (2026, p. 3) describes how “a neoliberal technocratic logic has emerged and come to dominate MHC provision”. The traditional hospital-centred model was “organised through a vertical structure dominated by experts and characterised by limited contact with community members and local environments” (p. 10). Suarez emphasises the innovation and significance of “Maroni’s Intercommunity psychiatric project”, which challenged the “top-down, expert-driven model that dominated hospital-based care” (p. 11).

Suarez carefully links changes in MHC to political developments. He stresses the importance of the return to democracy in Chile in the late 1980s, which led to three national health plans. These plans promoted primary care and centred on “relocating mental health services to community settings” (p. 18). Experts, it seems, oversaw this process. “Overall, MHC is largely organised from the top down, with interactions among experts exerting the greatest influence over what is medicalised, when, and where” (p. 17).

An alternative model of MHC is discussed in which “medicalised interpretations of distress were translated into, and incorporated within, a range of increasingly open institutions situated closer to communities” (p. 16). The prevailing “top-down, policy-driven framework” will, Suarez suggests, expand access to care but at the same time “depoliticizing mental suffering through an increasingly professionalised and bureaucratised biomedical rationale’” (p. 17).

Clearly, Suarez’s analysis sets out a contrast between expert-driven MHC and community alternatives. Does this interpretation support “populism” and its “core element” of “pitting the people in moral battle against elites’” (Meyer 2023, p. 847)? To describe Suarez’s account as supporting “populism” sadly misrepresents his detailed analysis of the “intersecting dynamic dimensions” that shape MHC provision. The analysis only looks like “populism” if you accept the dominant definition that populism is a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). As noted in the first entry in this series of three on “populism” (28 Sept 2926), when you set a definition for something, you are then constrained to make things match the definition, a restricting exercise. Rather, we need to pluralise the terms we adopt and keep them in play, be it “experts” or “the people”.

Conclusion

So, have we had enough of experts? Hardly. Almost every item on a news broadcast quotes “an expert”. Our task is to query the forms of analysis that are produced. WPR offers a way to do this.

Does this form of criticism end up supporting “populist” claims about “corrupt elites”, adding fuel to the “populist” fire? Should we reign in analyses that question how expert knowledges legitimise “intervention into virtually any aspect of life” (Suarez 2026, p. 17). Hopefully, you will recognise here a version of the “three waves” debate introduced above where Collins and Evans (2020) express concern that questioning scientific objectivity could create a “legitimacy crisis” for scientific expertise. Alternatively, is “science” one of the terms that needs to be “pluralised”? Quoting Davies (2019, p. 3), “it is no longer adequate to claim that expert knowledge of nature is simply ‘objective’, and to leave it at that”.

References

Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge.

Caudill, D. S. 2020. Expertise in Political Contexts: Latour Avec the Third Wave in Science and Technology Studies. Law, Technology and Humans, 2(2), https://doi.org/10.5204/lthj.v2i2.1413

Collins, H. M. and Evans, R. 2002. The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience. Social Studies of Science, 32: 235. DOI: 10.1177/0306312702032002003

Collins, H., Evans, R., Durant, D. and Weinel, M. 2020. Experts and the Will of the People. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Collins, H., Evans, R., Durant, D. and Weinel, M. 2023. The Third Wave and Populism: Scientific expertise as a check and balance. In G. Eyal and T. Medvetz (eds) Oxford Handbook of Expertise and Democratic Politics. Oxford: OUP.

Davies, W. 2020. Green Populism?: action and mortality in the anthropocene. Environmental Values, 29(6), 647–668. Retrieved from https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/27259/

Meyer, J. M. 2024. Power and Truth in Science-Related Populism: Rethinking the Role of Knowledge and Expertise in Climate Politics. Political Studies 72(3): 845-861, DOI: 10.1177/00323217231160370

Mol, A, Moser, I, Piras, EM, Turrini, M, Pols, J & Zanutto, A 2010, Care in practice: on normativity, concepts, and boundaries, Technoscienza, Italian Journal of Science and Technology Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 73–86. DOI: 10.6092/issn. 2038-3460/16996.

Mol, A 2002, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice, Duke University Press, Durham, NC.

Mudde C and Kaltwasser C R 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suarez, J. L. C. 2026. From the asylum to primary care: problematisation and re- problematisations in the making of formal mental health care in Chile. Social Theory & Health, 24(5), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41285-026-00252-1

Sunnercrantz, L. 2024. Experts and populism in the context of COVID-10. In Y. Stavrakakis and G. Katsambekis (eds) Research Handbook on Populism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 551-562. Available at: https://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Stavrakakis%20and%20Katsambekis%20%28eds%29%2C%20Research%20Handbook%20on%20Populism%20%282024%20–%20Edward%20Elgar%29.pdf

Voutyras, S. 2024. Anti-populism, meritocracy and (technocratic) elitism. In Y. Stavrakakis and G. Katsambekis (eds) Research Handbook on Populism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 35-48.

In the last entry I considered some of the political implications accompanying the use of definitions of “populism”. In this contribution, I expand the topic to explore theoretical contributions to the study of “populism”. The proposition grounding this second project is that it is possible to approach theories as problematisations and hence to apply WPR thinking to them. 

 In What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm (Bacchi 2026, Chapter 2) I consider some new departures in WPR studies. Specifically, I expand the kinds of material that can usefully be analysed through the application of the WPR approach. Alongside new “entities”, such as buildings and maps, media texts and interviews, I explain how to apply WPR to theoretical propositions.  

The argument, put briefly, is that researchers’ theoretical stances act as proposals and hence as problematisations. You will recognise here the starting premise in WPR that what we propose to do about something indicates what we think needs to change and hence what the “problem” is represented to be (Bacchi 2026, p. 5). If theoretical stances are proposals, they can provide the starting point for a WPR analysis. 

 Elsewhere I explain that I use the word “proposal” to refer to what Foucault calls “practical” or “prescriptive” texts (Bacchi 2026, pp. 18-20). Such texts are guides to the governing of conduct (“the conduct of conduct” (Bacchi 2026, p. 64). Theories, I argue, provide guides to conduct in the sense that they suggest how things ought to be. Consider as examples theories of “class struggle” or theories based on a realist perspective in international relations. In each case the theory has normative implications about desired futures. With this thinking, as Backman and Löfstrand (2022, p. 273) clarify, every piece of published research is in a sense a “prescriptive text” and can be subjected to a WPR-style analysis. The same thinking could be applied to unpublished research, e.g. PhD theses (this point was drawn to my attention in a query I received).

 Numerous researchers have used WPR in this form of application (i.e. to interrogate theoretical propositions) (see, for example, Johanson & Larsson 2022; Puukko 2024, and Zimmerman 2025). Specifically, these and other authors have produced literature reviews and other forms of meta-analysis based on how the selected topic is problematised. In each instance the material (i.e. the selected articles) is organized in relation to how the designated “problem” (e.g. “digital rights” in Puukko and “whistleblowing” in Zimmerman) is represented. Not only does this approach produce insightful analysis, it also serves as a political intervention through application of the WPR questions. For example, you can look at the various ways the topic is problematised and ask what is left out or silenced (Question 4 in Bacchi 2026, p. 24). You can also ask about the effects of the different problematisations (Question 5). 

 In this entry, I outline what could be accomplished by bringing this analytic strategy to theories concerning populism. As a starting point, I adopt the common classification of approaches to theorizing “populism” as objectivist, ideational and post-foundational. These categories are not absolute and blending of approaches is common (sub-categories will be added below). For other helpful classification schemes see Kim 2022 and Müller 2023. The purpose of this heuristic exercise is to identify how these contrasting approaches display paradigmatic assumptions illustrated through how “problems” are conceptualised. 

 Objectivist approaches 

At a basic level it is fair to describe objectivist approaches to “populism” as working within a positivist paradigm. They adopt the assumption that (objective) scholars can access information, or evidence about “the real”. Facts and values are held to be separate and distinct.  Head and Banerjee (2020) produce an objectivist approach to “populism”. “Populism” is treated as some form of political “force”.

Head and Banerjee (2020: Abstract; emphasis added) describe “populism and media-enhanced polarisation” as “forces” that “undermine the perceived legitimacy of using expertise and evidence in highly contested policy areas”. 

 It is important to pay attention to nuances in “objectivist” accounts. Contemporary discussions of policy-making attempt to strike a balance between claims to “objectivity” and values. Head and Banerjee (2020, p. 114) stress the need for improved decision-making and governance arrangements and explicitly state that “knowledge is always situated”. However, their emphasis remains on “independent experts”, “professional advice” and assumed problems. In objectivist accounts (Head and Banerjee 2020, p. 113), despite a passing reference to how “technical expertise” is “framed”, “problems” are “real”, and “solutions” rely on “evidence-based inquiry”.

“Technical expertise remains fundamentally important in framing complex problems, and in seeking solutions” (Head and Banerjee 2020, p. 113). 

 

There is slippage between objectivist and ideational accounts of “populism” (the latter to follow in the next section). Objectivist accounts accept the “core elements” of “the people” versus “the elite” that constitutes the basis of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s (2017) ideational definition of “populism” (see previous entry 29 August 2026). In objectivist accounts, the “force” that is called “populism” is castigated for its “anti-expertise” stance: “Populism trades on fanning anxieties, blaming minorities for social problems, and promising quick fixes built on ‘us versus them’ politics” (Head and Banerjee 2020, p. 111). 

“We argue that applying relevant expertise to public policy problems remains essential. (Head and Banerjee 2020: Abstract, emphasis added)”

The question of the place of “expertise” in populist accounts is pursued in a forthcoming Research Hub entry. 

 Ideational approaches

 In ideational accounts “populism” is identified as consisting of ideas and constituting an ideology. The previous entry (29 August 2026) quoted Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017; emphasis added) who offer an ideational definition of “populism”: 

“A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.”

 Mudde and Kaltwasser distinguish between “populism” as a “thin-centered ideology” – “a less-than-fully-fledged ideology with a limited conceptual core” (Kim 2022, p. 495) – and “host” ideologies, e.g. socialism, communism, fascism, etc., “to which populism cleaves”. The main content is provided by the “host ideology”. This means that the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” in populism are constructed categories that can vary over time and space (Zanotti 2024, p. 167). 

 Kim (2022) identifies a paradoxical “double movement” in Mudde’s ideational approach “insofar as populism is ascribed a high degree of indeterminacy”, given its linkage to various “hosts”, and, at the same time, a specifically moralisticcharacter, with moralism being “the essence of the populist division” of “purepeople” versus “corrupt elite.

Essential to the discourse of the populist is the normative distinction between “the elite” and “the people”  … Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil! (Mudde 2004, p. 544; emphasis in original)”

Meanwhile, as noted in the previous entry (29 August 2026), drawing attention to “elites” and “corruption” cannot, on its own, constitute “populism” since many political parties use this rhetoric:

It is argued that ideational scholars’ attribution of a moralistic particularity to populism runs the risk of pathologizing the latter for characteristics that are arguably constitutive of all politics. (Kim 2022: Abstract; emphasis added)

 

Ideational definitions hence run the risk of “disqualifying all forms of adversarial us-versus-them politics as pathological aberrations from neatly structured politics-as-usual” (Kim 2022, p. 497). This concern echoes the caution expressed in the previous entry (29 August 2026) on the political effects that accompany the tendency to talk about “right-wing” and “left-wing” “populism”. 

In Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) “ideology” operates in a descriptive sense to refer to clusters of ideas or political positions/views. “Ideas” feature prominently in the social sciences. They have become the moving “forces” that shape social and political developments. In these accounts, “ideas” function as abstract, cognitive systems of beliefs and values (Howarth and Griggs 2012, pp. 305-6). 

 By contrast, as discussed in the next section, in poststructuralist accounts, the goal is to keep a focus on the contingency of “things”, including “ideas”, and to draw attention to the multiple relations involved in their emergence and formation. “Ideas” and “ideologies” are considered to be increasingly unhelpful concepts in “visualising the detailed workings of the forms of thought and practice that shaped our contemporary existence and experience” (Rabinow and Rose 2003). Hence, “ideologies” lose their explanatory power. 

 Those who espouse an ideational approach to “populism” (e.g Mudde, Kaltwasser) treat problems as reflecting taken-for-granted states of being. For example, Mudde (2017; emphasis added) notes that: “By arguing to propose ‘common sense solutions’ to complex problems, populists often implicitly also argue that the elite creates problems and is out of touch with the people.” Given the theoretical stance on “ideas” as “things”, this conceptualisation of “problems” as real states of being is unsurprising.

 Post-foundational approaches 

The term “post-foundational” applies to a cluster of theoretical positions united by a questioning of Enlightenment assumptions concerning reason, emancipation, science and progress – our “foundations”, if you will. A broad philosophical perspective, it questions the possibility of any ultimate, fixed ground (or foundation) for truth, knowledge and identity. Post-structuralism offers an intersecting project that challenges established, stable, and universalizing structures. Post-structuralist approaches thus emphasise heterogeneity and contingency in the production of “populism” (Bacchi and Goodwin 2025, p. 4). As already noted, attention is directed to the plurality of practices involved in the emergence and formation of “things” (such as “populism” and “ideas”). 

 In this section I comment briefly on the positions associated with the poststructuralists, Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault. 

 Laclau and Mouffe 

The well-known poststructuralist scholars, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, theorise a “left populism” approach. In 2005 Laclau elaborated his formalconceptualisation of populism. As opposed to a “thin-ideology” (see Mudde above), Laclau analysed populism as a political logic – a way of thinking about politics – that could be used by the left, right or centre. In his account, “the people” and “the elite” (or enemy) are discursive constructions, the product of “a series of politico-discursive practices” (Laclau 2005a, p. 15). Mouffe stressed the need to construct a new political identity – “the people” – rather than simply representing a pre-existing historical formation (Judis 2016). 

 Laclau’s formal approach targets the conditions necessary for the emergence of populism rather than focussing on style and content. The defining features consist of: (1) the prevalence of the logic of equivalence; (2) the production of empty signifiers; and (3) “the construction of political frontiers through the interpellation of the underdog” (Laclau 2005a, p. 16). The “logic of equivalence” refers to “an equivalential chain between unfulfilled demands” (for example Sander’s national $15-an-hour minimum wage or Trump’s Mexican wall). When there is a situation in which “a plurality of unsatisfied demands and increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially coexist”, you have the conditions for a “populist rupture” (Judis 2016). 

 Together with Mouffe, Laclau presents left-wing populism as a new strategy for “radical democracy”, replacing the Marxist focus on class and incorporating the new social movements (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). They wished to challenge the European focus on right-wing populism. Mouffe (2011 interview quoted in Judis 2016) admits that she and Laclau may have misread the political situation. While they believed that Western Europe was ready to move beyond social democracy to embrace a more radical alternative, they failed to anticipate the triumph of a neoliberal approach that “stressed the virtues of unfettered market capitalism and the search for a consensus between centre left and centre right” (Judis 2016)”:

“In 1985 we said ‘we need to radicalize democracy’; now we first need to restore democracy, so we can then radicalize it; the task is far more difficult (Mouffe in interview)

 With all its formalism, Kim (2022, p. 499) shows there is a “crypto-normativity” in Laclau and Mouffe’s emphasis on the emancipatory effects of populism: “there is a tendency in Laclau’s work to (over-)emphasize the emancipatory effects of populism as a politics of the underdog”. In the previous entry I suggest that we are prisoners of the current political climate that makes “populism” a dangerous word. Meyenburg (2025, p. 1085) describes how “right-wing populism” arises as a strategic companion to neoliberalism, living off the crises caused by neoliberalist policies to manufacture an “emotionally charged antagonism of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’, which then produces crises itself that allow for the promotion of neoliberal policies in return”. 

Both Mouffe and Laclau use the term “problem” as a concept with taken-for-granted meaning. According to Mouffe (2007; emphasis added) “traditional democratic parties have become unable to face societal problems in a political way”. For Laclau (2005b, p. 73) the “demands” that form an “equivalential chain” include “problems with water, health, schooling”. The inadequate analytic scrutiny accorded “problem/s” appears elsewhere in poststructuralist texts (see Colebrook 2017; Bacchi 2026 p. 185). For an alternative theoretical stance, we turn to Foucault and “problematisation”. 

 Theorising contestation with Foucault

 Foucault challenges the place of “ideas” as mental perceptions shaping “reality” and turns instead to how specific phenomena are “conceptualised” or “problematised”. He sidesteps “ideas” and offers problematizations as a way to get inside “thinking”. In this way he looks to carve out a space between “idealism” and “realism” (Bacchi 2026, p. 74). Poststructuralist approaches, influenced by Foucault, eschew grand theory based on “ideology”, turning instead to the routine and mundane practices involved in the “shaping of governable domains and governable persons” (Rose et al. 2006, p. 101). 

 This theoretical strategy broadens our perspective on far-right (populist) contestation, illuminating struggles that “extend beyond formal institutions and electoral competitions and into the epistemic realm” (Simon 2025b, p. 1). It examines “how particular epistemic repertoires are drawn on and thus become productive in the formation of alternative or resisting instead of governable subjects”. Simon (2025b: Abstract) borrows the concept of “counter-conduct” from the Foucauldian toolbox to explore the positions adopted by Mothers for Liberty (M4L) in contemporary US politics. She shows their strong critique of expertise and their “tactics of scientific distrust” (Simon 2025b, p.5), indicating an unexpected alignment with left-wing criticisms of expert knowledges – the topic pursued in the next entry.

 Conclusion

 This entry introduces three principal frameworks adopted to theorize “populism”: objectivism, the ideational approach, post-foundationalism. The WPR questions operate in the background of the analysis to draw attention to underlying presuppositions, e.g. presumptions regarding the fixity of “things” and “ideas”, or convictions about the democratising effects of “populism” (Bacchi 2026, p. 24). How the different perspectives conceptualise “problems” serves as a litmus-test for underlying epistemological and ontological presuppositions. The turn to problematisation in Foucault-influenced approaches is highlighted as an innovative theoretical approach that challenges “problems” as entities.

  References 

Bacchi, C. 2023. Governmentalizing “policy studies”. In W. Walters and M. Tazzioli (Eds) Handbook on Governmentality. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar. 

 Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge.

 Bacchi, C. and Goodwin, S. 2025. Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice. Second edition. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 

 Colebrook, C 2017, ‘What is this thing called education?’, Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 649–655. DOI:10.1177/1077800417725357. 

 Head, B. W. & Banerjee, S. 2020. Policy expertise and use of evidence in a populist era. Australian Journal of Political Science, 55:1, 110-121, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2019.1686117 

 Howarth, D., & Griggs, S. 2012. Poststructuralist Policy Analysis: Discourse, Hegemony, and Critical Explanation. In F. Fischer, & H. Gottweis (Eds.), The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice (pp. 305-342). Durham: Duke University Press. 

Johansson, A & Larsson, J 2022, ‘Identity perspectives in research on university physics education: what is the problem represented to be?’, in HT Holmegaard & L Archer (eds), Science identities: theory, method and research, Springer, Cham, pp. 163–184. DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-17642-5_8. 

Judis, J. B. 2016. Rethinking Populism. Dissent Magazine, available at: https://dissentmagazine.org/article/rethinking-populism-laclau-mouffe-podemos/#:~:text=Laclau%20analyzed%20populism%20as%20a,political%20discourse%20rather%20than%20the 

Kim, S. 2022. Taking stock of the field of populism research: Are ideational approaches ‘moralistic’ and post- foundational discursive approaches ‘normative’?Politics, 42(4): 492-504, DOI: 10.1177/02633957211007053. 

Laclau, E. 2005a. Populism: What’s in a Name? In F. Panizza (ed.) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. NY: Verso Books. 

 Laclau, E. 2005b. On Populist Reason. NY: Verso Books.Meyenburg, I. 2025. Neoliberalism and Right-Wing Populism–A Love Story. Journal of Economic Issues, 59:4, 1084-1096, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2025.2575146 

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. NY: Verso Books.

 Mouffe, C. 2007. “Democracy in Europe: The Challenge of Right-wing Populism”. 

 Mudde C (2004) The populist zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39(4): 541–563. Mudde, C. 2017. Populism: An Ideational Approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo and P. Ostiguy (eds) Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 Meyenburg, I. 2025. Neoliberalism and Right-Wing Populism–A Love Story. Journal of Economic Issues, 59:4, 1084-1096, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2025.2575146 

 Mudde C and Kaltwasser C R 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 Müller, J. F. 2025. An Epistemic Account of Populism. Episteme, 22, 1-22, doi:10.1017/epi.2023.39 

 Puukko, O 2024, ‘Rethinking digital rights through systemic problems of communication’, Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, no. 82, pp. 1–19, DOI: 10.4185/ rlcs-2024-2044. 

Rabinow, P & Rose, N 2003, ‘Introduction: Foucault today’, in P Rabinow & N Rose (eds), The essential Foucault: selections from the essential works of Foucault, 1954–1984, New Press, New York, pp. vii–xxxv. 

 Rose, N., O’Malley, P., Valverde, M. (2006). Governmentality, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2, 83–104.

 Simon, J. 2025a. ‘After Neoliberalism’ and on the ‘Dark Side’? Governmentality and Counter-Conduct in Times of Growing Autocratisation, Global Society, 39:1, 1-15, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2024.2401552 

 Simon, J. 2025b. An Analytics of Far-Right Populist Contestation and the Case of ‘Awakened Mothers’ in US Public Education and Beyond, Global Society, DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2025.2468946   

 Zimmerman, P 2025, ‘Staging debates in whistleblowing research: A problematizing literature review’, Journal of Business Ethics, advance online publication. DOI:10.1007/ s10551-025-05990-2. 

Zanotti, L. 2024. The ideational approach to populism. In Y. Stavrakakis and G. Katsambekis (eds) Research Handbook on Populism. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. pp. 166-177.

Do we need another article or commentary on the meaning of populism? Lord, no! My research on this topic suggests that theoretical contributions are beginning to repeat themselves. Hence, I take a different starting point. I ask: “What’s at stake in how we think about populism?”. The title for the entry indicates the perspective I develop – my concerns about the overuse of “populism” and about the political implications of different characterisations and definitions. 

This entry was prompted by the frequent use of the term “populism” in contemporary politics and political analysis. I found myself wanting some guidance on the phenomenon. In addition, I wanted to see if WPR thinking (Research Hub entry 28 Dec 2025) could assist with this task. 

This entry will be the first of three contributions on the topic. It probes some of the definitional debates around “populism”. The next entry applies the WPR approach to important theoretical propositions about populism, including the “ideational” approach (Mudde 2017) and post-foundational contributions (e.g. Laclau 2005). These are preliminary investigations which, I hope, may stimulate interest on this vitally important topic and prompt additional research. 

“Defining” “populism” 

When theorists engage with the topic of “populism” they tend to adopt one of two different strategies: offering a definition or, bypassing definitions, to offer characterisations – lists of characteristics or principles. In this entry we pursue the first of these approaches. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) offer the best-known definition:  

A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.

In a survey of the extensive literature on populism, Mansbridge and Macedo (2019, p. 60) conclude that “the only core elements – in both theory and practice – are ‘pitting the people in moral battle against elites’” (Meyer 2023, p. 847; emphasis in original).

A poststructuralist framework, such as WPR, encourages us to think about how definitions, such as the one just offered, constitute problematisations. Providing definitions is considered to be a limiting exercise. Mol et al. (2010) describe how, if you define what an apple is, you are henceforth constrained to see as apples only those things that match that definition. It follows that, if we accept Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition of “populism”, we can only see political developments that match that characterisation. 

A more critical approach would ask how that definition represents the “problem” of “populism” (see Question 5 in WPR, Bacchi 2026, pp. 22-24). The thinking here follows Andersen’s (2003) work on the theoretical usefulness of second-order observation. This analytic strategy suggests that much is to be gained by refusing to reduce an observation to something else (for example, an ideology) and, instead, to produce an observation of an observation (Andersen 2003; Goodwin 2010). I will be offering observations of the Mudde and Kaltwasser observation (definition), focusing specifically on the distinction commonly drawn between “left-wing” and “right-wing” “populisms”. 

Where do definitions lead?

The Mudde and Kaltwasser definition produces “populism” as a singular phenomenon. “Populism” operates as a “catch-all label for political platforms or movements that challenge the political order, drawing on the “elite” versus “people” dichotomy” (Müller 2025, p. 19). In this tradition the analysis becomes about “populism” pure and simple (Head and Banerjee 2020), or there are broad generalisations such as “in populist times” (Meyer 2024, p. 847) or “populist political orientation” (Štětka et al. 2025, p. 1039). Judis (2016) describes populism as “occurring independently of political leanings” (in Meyenburg 2025). 

Within the broad category of “populism” Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) argue that “left-wing populism is much more inclusionary and socio-economically egalitarian than its right-wing counterpart” (in Meyenburg 2025, p. 1088). We have here distinctions drawn within a general phenomenon, thus retaining the broad category “populism”. 

Müller (2025, p.19) contends that such a “loose conception” of “populism” is overinclusive. He sees the people/elite dichotomy as rhetorics that “obscure important differences between political ideologies”: 

“They tend to lump together distinct political platforms – such as left- and right-wing parties – which not only have very different historical roots but also adhere to fundamentally different set (sic) of normative and epistemological premises.”

Müller suggests that we need closer examination of specific political perspectives. Drawing attention to “elites” and “corruption” cannot, on its own, constitute “populism”.  

“As noted by political economist László Andor (2020: 24), even green and liberal parties in developing countries occasionally employ this rhetoric to combat entrenched elite corruption.”

Wilder (2026) agrees. He notes how the common tendency to refer to “populism” as embracing “left-wing” and “right-wing” versions has a range of concerning political effects. Such an approach, he argues, leads to the characterisation of all “populist” leaders as similar and as lacking in desirable traits.

 Bernie Sanders and Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez are treated as “left analogues of ultraright racist, xenophobic, militarized, antidemocratic, and fascistic politics that have become increasingly normalized in recent years”. 

Wilder recognises that “both currents” (“left” and “right”) challenge traditional elites, entrenched institutions, and certain liberal norms. “But”, he emphasises, “they are otherwise incommensurable” (emphasis added). Andor (2020, p. 22) is similarly critical of “heaping together various political qualities, e.g. the far right and the radical left, which are otherwise arch enemies of each other” (emphasis added). 

Positing a “false equivalence” between “right” and “left” “populism” treats “insurgent politics [of all kinds] as intrinsically antidemocratic” (Wilder 2026). A general “taming” of political action and protest takes place – “civic virtue is identified with civility, compromise, and consensus” (Wilder 2026). 

To work against these effects, Wilder (2026) recommends leaving behind the common practice of referring to “left-wing” and “right-wing” “populism” and adopting Stuart Hall’s (1988a) distinction between “authoritarian populism” and “popular democracy”. Wilder elaborates: 

“I thus break with the common tendency to regard authoritarianism as one form that populism may assume. Rather, I suggest that we recognize populism as one form that authoritarianism may assume.” 

In this suggestion, “populism” becomes a secondary term and our political analysis targets authoritarian political practices. Mudde (in Petersen 2013; emphasis added) also recommends that far-right parties should be called “populist radical right” as opposed to “radical right populist”, as the latter would put the emphasis on populism (a secondary characteristic) away from radical right (which Mudde argued was the core of the ideology). Following this argument, I would prefer that we talk about “populist authoritarianism” rather then “authoritarian populism”. 

Wilder’s political evaluation goes further. He follows Stuart Hall’s (1988b, p. 56 in Wilder) analysis of the rise of Thatcher with the proposition that “the right is what it is partly because of what the left is”. In looking to explain the rise of “right-wing populism”, he challenges “liberalism’s refusal to recognize the manifold ways that its own assumptions, politics, contradictions, and impasses are implicated in the rise of authoritarian populism, insofar as it helped to create its conditions of possibility” (see Research Hub entry on Authoritarian Governmentality 28 Sept 2025). In this explanation, “a contradictory liberalism nourishes authoritarian populism that in turn serves as an alibi for more liberalism”. There is clearly a lot at stake in our theoretical choices. 

Returning to the question of definitions, producing a term “populism” invokes its opposite, “not populism”. Such a distinction makes it difficult to analyse the terrain between the two and hence overlaps in political developments. The targeting of “populism”, for example, allows political leaders to rule in ways that are meant to keep “the populists” at bay:

Blanket anti-populism today opens the door to Macron-ism (i.e. a belief that progressives are supposed to integrate into a broad, pro-European, but essentially technocratic tent, and that staving off the far right requires dropping the social agenda. (Andor 2020, p. 26; emphasis added).

Indicatively, Hillary Clinton (2018) cautioned European leaders to “curb immigration to stop right-wing populists”. On this point we need to watch Tony Burke’s much anticipated announcement on immigration. 

 “Populism” as euphemism?

When we adopt a euphemism, the intent is to “soften” the message, to make it more palatable to more people. So, we talk about “passing away” instead of “dying”. If we are concerned about authoritarian developments in diverse political settings worldwide, it may be wise to avoid the euphemism “populism” for such developments. Andor (2020, p. 26) makes the point clearly: 

While not at all irrelevant as a concept, the overuse of populism today is a sign of intellectual laziness and a substitute for proper political analysis. It has never properly been explained why nationalist, authoritarian, far right and neo-fascist tendencies should not be called nationalist, authoritarian, far right, or neo-fascist, but populist instead.

There are expressed attempts to win over “populism” for the left that deserve attention. We will be looking at Laclau (2005) next time. In an article titled “Green Populism? Action and mortality in the Anthropocene”, Davies (2019, Abstract) argues on behalf of “a less pejorative understanding of populism”. He expresses the hope that “we might be able to identify elements within that can be usefully channelled and mobilised towards the urgent rescue of human and non-human life”. He identifies a number of “left populists” who are “already positioning environmental issues as popular concerns”. Along similar lines, Agustín (2025, p. 73) pursues how “left-wing or progressive populism relates to environmental issues” and likewise speaks about “green populism”.

Meyer (2024) explains the context for these “green” interventions. He calls for “a more inclusive conception of populism and a more critical and plural account of expertise”. According to Meyer, what is at stake is competing worldviews. He mentions, for example, Indigenous ecological knowledge and citizen science, as ways of knowing that contest dominant forms of science and elite power (Meyer 2023, p. 846). Going further, he describes these ways of knowing as themselves “forms of expert knowledge”. In this way Meyer, along with Davies and Agustin, disrupt the core part of the definition of “populism” produced by Mudde and Kwalwasser (see above) that sets “the people” against “elites”. Whether or not it is possible to “reclaim” populism from the nationalists and neo-fascists identified by Andor (above) is up for debate.

Currently I find myself more concerned by the euphemistic adoption of “populism” (for neo-fascism, authoritarianism, etc.) than by the possibility of reclaiming the term. I would suggest that to an extent we are prisoners of the current political climate that makes “populism” a dangerous word. Reflecting on how definitions set the parameters for judging political developments, I also fear that we may see more and more “populisms” replacing thoughtful political analysis. 

With the “core elements” of “populism” identified as “pitting the people in moral battle against elites” (see above), where does this leave governmentality studies that raise critical questions regarding “expert knowledges” (Bacchi 2026, pp. 4, 15)? Will they fall within some broad “populist” branding? Or would appeals to the “voice” of the people and to “lived experience” as a form of knowledge be cast as a species of “populist” thinking because they appear to adopt a “people vs expert” framework? On this criterion, are we all “populists”? 

Conclusion

The point of this entry is to encourage a different approach to “populism” from conventional definitional approaches. It highlights the need to consider the political implications of our theoretical propositions (including our definitions). Mol’s (2002, p. 155; emphasis in original) argument about the political impact of “methods” sets the tone: “Methods are not a way of opening a window on the world, but a way of interfering with it. They act, they mediate between an object and its representation”.

Some strategies to manage overuse of the term “populism” could involve: (1) treating “populism” as a secondary characteristic, thereby focusing attention on the political agendas of so-called “populists”; (2) paying close attention to the repercussions of producing dichotomies (i.e. people vs elite; populism/not populism) in one’s analysis, considering what is left unsaid (see Question 4 in WPR, Bacchi 2026, pp. 22-24); and (3) following Andor (2020) placing emphasis on the substance rather than the style of “populism”, requiring “deep inquiry into historical background and economic foundations … to better understand nationalist and far-right tendencies and to develop more effective strategies against right-wing extremism in the name of humanity, equality and solidarity”. 

REFERENCES

Agustín, O. G. and Jerne, I. 2025. Green populism: Counterpublics and the formation of counterknowledge. In M. M. Roslyng, A. Rantasila, A. and A. M. Jönsson (eds) Communicating Science, Climate Change and the Environment in Hybrid Media, NY: Routledge.

Andersen, N. 2003. Discursive analytical strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau Luhmann. Bristol: Policy Press.

Andor, L. 2020. Against a General Theory of Populism: The Case of East-Central Europe. ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Forum, DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0864-6 

Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge.

Clinton, H. 2018. The Guardian 23 November. 

Davies, W. 2020. Green Populism?: action and mortality in the anthropocene. Environmental Values, 29(6), 647–668. Retrieved from https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/27259/ 

Goodwin, S. 2010. Chapter 15: Analysing Policy as Discourse: Methodological Advances in Policy Analysis. In L. Markauskaite, P. Freebody and J. Irwin (eds) Methodological Choice and Design: Scholarship, Policy and Practice in Social and Educational Research, pp. 167-180.

Hall, S. 1988a. Authoritarian populism: a reply to Jessop. In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left. S. Hall, ed. pp. 115–124. London: Verso. 

Hall, S. 1988b. The great moving right show. In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left. S. Hall, ed. Pp. 39–56. London: Verso. 

Head, B. W. & Subho Banerjee 2020. Policy expertise and use of evidence in a populist era, Australian Journal of Political Science, 55:1, 110-121, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2019.1686117 

Judis, J. B. 2016. The Populist Explosion – How the Great Recession transformed American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports.

Laclau, E 2005. Populism: What’s in a name? In: Panizza F (ed.) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. London: Verso, pp.32–49.

Mansbridge J and Macedo S 2019. Populism and Democratic Theory. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15 (1): 59–77. 

Meyenburg, I. 2025. Neoliberalism and Right-Wing Populism–A Love Story, Journal of Economic Issues, 59:4, 1084-1096, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2025.2575146 

Meyer, J. M. 2024. Power and Truth in Science-Related Populism: Rethinking the Role of Knowledge and Expertise in Climate Politics. Political Studies 72(3): 845-861, DOI: 10.1177/00323217231160370.

Mol, A, Moser, I, Piras, EM, Turrini, M, Pols, J & Zanutto, A 2010, Care in practice: on normativity, concepts, and boundaries, Technoscienza, Italian Journal of Science and Technology Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 73–86. DOI: 10.6092/issn. 2038-3460/16996. 

Mol, A 2002, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice, Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 

Mudde, C. 2017. Populism: An ideational approach. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart PA, Espejo PO and Ostiguy P (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.27–47.

Mudde C and Kaltwasser C R 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Müller, J. F. 2025. An Epistemic Account of Populism. Episteme, 22, 1-22, doi:10.1017/epi.2023.39 

Petersen, M. 2013. Populism as a thought-defying cliché. Open Democracy, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/populism-as-thought-defying-cliche-2/. Referenced 30 April 2026.

Štětka, V. et al. 2025. Have people “had enough of experts”? The impact of populism and pandemic misinformation on institutional trust in comparative perspective, Information, Communication & Society, 28:6, 1039-1060, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2024.2413121 Wilder, G. 2026. Populism as Liberal Alibi: Recalling Stuart Hall’s Analysis of Thatcherism. Current Anthropology, 67, supplement 26, https://doi.org/10.1086/739791

I ended my last entry (“‘Engaging’ with generative AI”, 28 June 2026) by asking if a “reflexive” GenAI is feasible and what would this look like. My query was prompted by Zheng and Hardy (2026) who use GenAI (Copilot) in their WPR study of a Chinese education policy document pertaining to the initiation of national competency-based education reforms.

In that entry I pointed out that Zheng and Hardy omitted a part of the WPR approach, specifically the undertaking to apply the WPR questions to your own problem representations. This undertaking is named as Step 7 of the approach in Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016, p. 20, and as Process 7 in Bacchi 2026, p. 24. It is intended to encourage “self”-problematisation, explained in some detail in Chapter 6 of Bacchi 2026. I note in the 2026 book that I changed the wording from “Step 7” to “Process 7” to reinforce the interconnected nature of the WPR forms of analysis (Bacchi 2026, p. 25 fn 2). ChatGPT tends to refer to Step 7. 

At the end of the previous entry on Zheng and Hardy (28 June 2026), I was left wondering what would have happened to the analysis if Process 7 has been included – how would GenAI deal with “self”-problematisation? I decided to find out. 

Stage 1: Applying the WPR template

I borrowed the policy document from Zheng and Hardy and prompted ChatGPT: “Apply the seven questions in Bacchi’s WPR to China’s education policy, called the Suyang (素养) policy.” (In this entry I am restricting my comments to experiments with ChatGPT-5.5.) Note that I say “seven questions” to ensure that Process 7 is included. 

ChatGPT responded by clarifying its task: “I’ll treat ‘Suyang/素养’ as the Chinese education-policy discourse around student ‘core competencies’ or ‘quality/competence cultivation,’ then map it through Bacchi’s seven WPR questions”. Note the reference to “seven” questions.

To begin, the ChatGPT analysis stated that “Below is one way to apply Bacchi’s ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) framework to China’s Suyang / 素养 policy, usually translated as core competencies, key competencies, or competence-based education”. Allow me to highlight the reference here to “one way” to apply WPR, linked to the proposition considered later in this entry that there are different “versions” of WPR (see below).

ChatGPT proceeds to apply WPR, addressing each question and the undertaking to apply the questions to your own problem representations (i.e. Step/Process 7). For those of you who have engaged this program previously, you will not be surprised to find out that it does a superlative job. I could not help but be impressed by the insights generated. 

I do not intend to run through the complete analysis as you can access this material yourself by asking ChatGPT to apply WPR to the selected Chinese language policy (you may of course receive modified analysis). Instead, I intend to zoom in on the topic of interest in this Research Hub entry – how did ChatGPT deal with Step/Process 7 and hence with “self”-problematisation? 

Stage 2: Applying Step/Process 7

ChatGPT introduces this task by asking analysts “to turn the lens back on themselves”. It proceeds to produce some perceptive insights. For example, it notes: 

“In my analysis above, I have represented the suyang policy partly as a form of governance through competence. That framing carries its own assumptions. It may overemphasise control, standardisation, and subject formation, while underplaying genuine educational aspirations within the policy: reducing rote learning, broadening student development, supporting moral education, and making learning more relevant. (Analysis performed using ChatGPT on 18 May 2026; emphasis in original).”

ChatGPT proceeds to note that the “critical policy tradition” “implicitly drawn on” in the analysis “risks treating policy ideals as mainly disciplinary or instrumental”. It therefore concludes that “A fairer analysis would hold both possibilities together”:

“suyang policy may be both an attempt to humanise education beyond exam scores and a way of expanding the state’s capacity to define and monitor desirable student subjectivities. (emphasis added)”

Here I want to highlight the phrase “A fairer analysis”. The language of fair and unfair does not do justice to the “self”-problematisation undertaking. The point is not to pass judgement on your problematisations but to probe them for unexamined assumptions. As Stengers (2008, p. 46) explains, there is a need to “make ‘us’ hesitate about our own conditions of thought” (pp. 41–42). Here Stengers is signalling the need to pay attention to the deep-seated epistemological and ontological assumptions that make “our own conditions of thought” possible. In addition, the statement that a more desirable analysis (“a fairer analysis”) would hold the two propositions together (“hold both possibilities together”) imposes a “neutrality” that has political effects – as I proceed to explain. 

ChatGPT ends the section on Step/Process 7 by describing “my own problem representation”:

“The suyang policy may transform the apparent problem of narrow education into a broader project of governing students, teachers, and schools through competency discourse.”

It then offers an “alternative reading”:

“The suyang policy is an attempt to reconcile Chinese moral-political educational traditions, global competency-based reform, and practical dissatisfaction with rote learning.”

Importantly, the ChatGPT analysis concludes that “both readings are plausible”: “A strong WPR analysis would not simply decide which one is ‘true,’ but examine how each framing makes some things visible and others less visible”. 

I took exception to the suggestion that both “readings” were “plausible”. Indeed, the reference to the contrasting problem representations as “readings” reveals an approach to WPR distinctly at odds with its development in my writing. In that work the goal is to consider how governing takes place through selected policies and governmental mechanisms, not to produce competing accounts of modes of governance. I decided to pursue the point with ChatGPT. 

Prompting ChatGPT 

I prompted: “Doesn’t your argument that both readings are plausible ignore the political dimension of the issue?”

With this prompt, things started to get interesting. 

ChatGPT responded: “Yes – that is a fair criticism”.  

I was happy to hear it. 

It continued: 

“Saying ‘both readings are plausible’ risks making the analysis sound overly balanced or neutral, when WPR is specifically designed to expose how policy problematisations are political. In this case, the politics are not incidental; they are central.”

I was very happy to hear it. 

We are then offered what is described as “a better WPR reading” and “a more critical Bacchian version”, “a sharper version” and a “stronger WPR analysis”. The “sharper version” would conclude: “The suyang policy should not be understood as a neutral correction to exam-oriented schooling. It is a political problematisation of the student, the teacher, and the purpose of schooling.” 

As with the language of “fairer” above, the suggestion that there are “stronger” and “weaker” versions of WPR misses the point and purpose of WPR as an analytic strategy. Its goal is to encourage political reflection on governing practices in order to highlight where changes may be needed. A WPR way of thinking provides a framework for reflecting critically on these variables. Such critical reflections “sow the seeds of judgement” (Osborne 1998 in Rose 2000, p. 59), helping to make judgement possible. 

By contrast, in this application of WPR, the analysis is put forward as balanced or neutral, in line with ChatGPT’s insistence that it does not engage in politically partisan issues, as pointed out in the earlier Research Hub entry 29 Sept.2023 on the topic. ChatGPT produces analyses in line with the theoretical framing offered by WPR but it does not itself take a political stand. It suggests the situation is a matter of “fair” or “less fair” analysis, or of “weaker” or “stronger” views.

Note, I am not saying that ChatGPT is politically neutral. In the earlier entry (29 Sept 2023) I point to a neoliberal bias in the model I used. Here, I am highlighting that ChatGPT claims to be neutral. I would argue that the position of “neutrality” that it defends is a political stance! Referring to “weaker” and “stronger” versions of WPR neutralizes the political analysis – very much a political effect that requires questioning. 

What does all this mean in terms of how we can use ChatGPT? In the previous entry (28 June 2026) I highlight its usefulness in translation. I would also suggest that the analysis performed in this particular case is very useful and would certainly alert readers to points that might not have occurred to them. Still, it remains important, I believe, to recognise the depoliticizing effects of its defence of political neutrality. 

The politics of “prompting” WPR

The point I make above is driven home if we consider the kind of analysis produced prior to my second prompt (repeated here from above) -“Doesn’t your argument that both readings are plausible ignore the political dimension of the issue?”. 

You may recall that the conclusion ChatGPT reached prior to my second prompt is that two opposed readings of China’s education were plausible. It reads:

 “The suyang policy may transform the apparent problem of narrow education into a broader project of governing students, teachers, and schools through competency discourse.”

It then offers an “alternative reading”.

“The suyang policy is an attempt to reconcile Chinese moral-political educational traditions, global competency-based reform, and practical dissatisfaction with rote learning.”

Without my second prompt, the matter would be left there, with researchers more or less being invited to choose one or the other proposition. Underlying political issues are left undiscussed, encouraging a poorly developed understanding. 

I raised the same issue in the earlier Research Hub entry (29 Sept 2023). There I addressed the question of whether or not AI has a left-leaning bias, a common characterisation (see earlier entry). By examining the responses to the WPR questions, I was able to show a neoliberal or liberal leaning rather than a structural perspective. None of this would have emerged without useful prompts. As I conclude in that entry: “it was possible to shift ChatGPT in the direction of a more structural analysis through asking explicit follow-up questions”. As I go on to argue, to pose such follow-up questions requires a prior engagement with the literature and with contesting points of view. 

In the case at hand, without the second prompt, we would be left with a view that WPR can either support the status quo or not – it’s up to you. It is argued: you can “choose” a weaker or a stronger version of WPR.

This result suggests to me that we need coaching in how to prompt. Basically, what is reported reflects what is asked. We need to find ways to ensure that politics remains front and centre of the questioning. With my second prompt (see above) I managed to extract a more structural understanding of the “problem” of Chinese education policy. Could I have pushed the matter further? Possibly. 

The key outcome, as I see it, is to recognize that the material produced in ChatGPT reflects the material available. There is an inherent conservative bias. When or if we ask it to apply WPR we can expect something like what is produced in the reading above – a “balanced” view of the matter. The final message, then, is to tread cautiously around the analysis produced. 

“Politics of the prompt” (Amoore 2026)

An important article by Amoore et al. (2026) on the “politics of the prompt” allows us to understand what happened to WPR at the hands of ChatGPT – how it was neutralised. They describe “the prompt” as a “mutation in the exercise of political power”: “the formulation of the prompt changes the politics of what can be said, what questions can be asked, what decisions can be made”. As I outlined in the previous section, my second prompt made it possible to produce a more structural analysis of the Chinese education reforms. Without that prompt, the analysis would have been politically “neutral” and hence neutralized. 

Amoore et al. (2026; Abstract) locate themselves within a tradition of thought that conceives of government as “the broad ensemble of ‘techniques and procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct of self and others’ (Foucault 2010, p. 4).” Working in that governmentality tradition (Bacchi 2026, Chapter 7), they describe “the prompt” as 

“an emerging political technology which makes possible a wider governmental rationality – a means of conducting conduct, governing population and ordering the space of what can count as the political (Barry, 2001; Dean, 1999; Miller & Rose, 1990) Amoore et al. 2026, p. 575, emphasis in original).  

The authors identify three defining features of the “governmental rationality” of “the prompt”: describing a task, eliciting a desired response, and engineering a prompt. When describing a task, “the user’s interaction with the model is always also the shaping of the model and the world as such” (Amoore et al. 2026, p. 581). Eliciting prompts involves eliciting a desired behaviour from the model (p. 583). To prompt heralds the arrival of the “prompt engineer”, “a novel form of expertise and a new kind of self-governing subject” (p. 586). 

According to Amoore et al. (2026, p. 582) “the prompt frames, delimits and condenses what can be known of the problem (‘what do we know about?’) and aligns that problem ever closer to the task that best fits the model’s view of the world.” Here I’d point out how references to “problems” and “problem-solving” form part of the taken-for-granted framework of “computational thinking” (Bacchi 2026, pp. 206-208). In this thinking, the goal is to find the most appropriate prompt “to allow a language model to solve the task at hand” (p. 586). There is no space in this thinking to query the nature or purpose of the task. The status quo is reinforced.

If “prompts” shape social relations, we need to attend to them carefully. It’s all in the questions. You will get what you ask for. As Baum and Villasenor (2023; emphasis added) note, 

“seemingly small changes in how a prompt is constructed can lead to very different responses. This is because AI-powered chatbots identify which data to draw from in a manner that is highly sensitive to the specific phrasing of the query”.

To repeat the point made in the earlier entry (29 Sept 2023), thinking precedes prompting. I’m not suggesting here that we become “prompt engineers” (see Amoore et al. on this topic). Rather, we need to become aware of the political dimension lurking within apparently “neutral” commentary, and consider how your prompts can affect that analysis. The initial ChatGPT output needs to be approached sceptically with follow-up questions that ensure politics remains a primary consideration. Beyond recognizing how prompts shape realities, the politics of the prompt includes consideration of the effects that accompany a failure to prompt. 

Conclusion

As indicated above, I was deeply impressed with many of the insights generated when I asked ChatGPT to analyse China’s education reforms using WPR. My specific goal was to observe how Step/Process 7 was handled. The section on Step/Process 7 displayed some useful consideration of the assumptions within ChatGPT’s WPR analysis. Things “broke down”, I would say, in the (1) general framing of WPR as “strong” or “weak”, as appearing in “versions”, and (2) the suggestion that blending these “versions” is a useful way to proceed. Here ChatGPT fails to apply “self”-problematisation to this analysis and hence fails to recognize the politically quiescent view of social relations that accompanies it. 

References

Amoore, L., Bennett, SJ, Campolo, A., Jacobsen, B. and Rella, L. 2026. Politics of the prompt: Government in the age of generative AI. Economy and Society, 54:3, 573-596, DOI: 10.1080/03085147.2025.2560177 

Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge. 

Bacchi, C. and Goodwin, S. 2016. Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice. Second edition, 2025. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Barry, A. (2001). Political machines: Governing a technological society.Bloomsbury.

Baum, J. and Villasenor, J. (2023). The politics of AI: ChatGPT and political bias. Brookings, 8 May. (https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2023/05/08/the-politics-of-ai-chatgpt-and-political-bias/

Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. Sage.

Foucault, M. (2010). The government of self and others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–1983. Palgrave Macmillan. 

Miller, P. & Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society, 19(1), 1–31.

Rose, N 2000, Powers of freedom: reframing political thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511488856. 

Stengers, I 2008, ‘Experimenting with refrains: subjectivity and the challenge of escaping modern dualism’, Subjectivity, vol. 22, pp. 38–59. DOI: 10.1057/sub. 2008.6. 

Zheng, D. and Hardy, I. 2026. “Thinking the unthinkable: Generative AI for collaborative, intra-active policy analysis”. Methodological Innovations,

https://doi.org/10.1177/20597991261448572

This entry is prompted by an article by Danson Zheng and Ian Hardy titled: “Thinking the unthinkable: Generative AI for collaborative, intra-active policy analysis” (Methodological Innovations, 2026).I call to “stop the press” because of the urgency of this topic.

The project in Zheng and Hardy, put simply, is to facilitate a form of dialogue between the researcher and Copilot, an AI-powered conversational assistant. The intended outcome is to generate novel insights into the researched topic. In particular, the goal is to assist researchers to think beyond conventional conceptual premises, thereby assisting them to address Question 4 in the WPR approach: “What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? What is silenced? Can the ‘problem’ be conceptualised differently?” (Bacchi 2026, p. 24).

This project is of particular interest to WPR researchers because WPR is selected as the “analytical method” guiding the analysis. Specifically, WPR is drawn upon to inform the analysis of a Chinese education policy document pertaining to the initiation of national competency-based education reforms within the whole Chinese education system. The Zheng and Hardy article provides a good deal of detail about exactly how the researchers approached this task. Their approach included asking Copilot specifically about its understanding of WPR to see if it matched that of the primary researcher, Danson (Zheng’s first name Danson is used throughout the article): “With this explicit guidance, Copilot responded with interpretations of the theoretical underpinnings as the way Danson understood the [WPR] approach” (Zheng and Hardy 2026, p. 7). 

In a past entry (Research Hub 29 Sept 2023) I indicated that I was interested in seeing what AI had to offer WPR researchers. I continue to think this topic is vitally important given the speed at which AI is developing and its expanding place in our lives. The Zheng and Hardy article attracted my interest primarily because it directly considers if Copilot comprehends the theory informing a WPR analysis. For example, Danson (Zheng) asks Copilot about the place of Foucault in WPR: “Could you explain how Bacchi’s WPR approach is built on Foucault’s concepts?”. In this Research Hub entry I will highlight the parts of the Zheng and Hardy analysis that I found most useful and indicate areas where, I believe, more thinking is required. The commitment to produce a form of “agential engagement between the human ‘I’ and the non-human ‘GenAI’” is, I believe, well worthwhile but there are obstacles to overcome.

Copilot, Danson and WPR

The difficulties begin at the outset. Danson (Zheng) asks Copilot: “could you use the six analytical questions in Bacchi’s WPR approach to analyse” the specified Chinese education policy? As is well known, with AI usage, you will get basically what you ask for, making it crucial to pay attention to your questions. Danson asks for sixWPR questions as listed on page 6 of the Zheng and Hardy article. The questions are taken from Bacchi 2012, p. 21. I won’t repeat them since they are commonly referenced. 

What I wish to point out is that something is missing from the list. At the bottom of the list of questions in the 2012 article (on p. 21), it reads “Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations”. This statement fails to appear in Danson. I’ll admit that, in the 2012 publication, it may have been possible to consider this instruction as outside of, rather than part of, WPR. However, if researchers check other renditions of the WPR Table of “questions” it is difficult to make this error of omission. For example, in both Tables in Analysing Policy (Bacchi 2009), the statement “Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations” appears clearly as part of the WPR approach (see the boxed versions in Bacchi 2009, p. xii and p.48). The latter offers this expansion of the presuppositions underpinning the instruction:

“Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations. This stage of the analysis requires a form of reflexivity, which involves subjecting the grounding assumptions in one’s own problem representations to critical scrutiny. (emphasis added)”

Bacchi 2009 appears in the reference list for Zheng and Hardy (2026) so these elaborations of the WPR framework were readily available.

Because researchers tend to ignore this undertaking to apply the WPR questions to their own problem representations (because it is not assigned a number in 2009?) my colleague, Susan Goodwin, and I made its status clear in the 2016 book, Poststructural Policy Analysis: A guide to practice (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, p. 20). There (and again in the 2025 second edition, p. 24) the undertaking to apply the WPR questions to one’s own proposals is called “Step 7”. Finally, in my 2026 book, I change the word “Step” to “Process” to encourage continual application of the principle, which I call “self”-problematisation (see Bacchi and Goodwin 2025, pp. 42-26 and Bacchi 2026, Chapter 6). The importance of this undertaking as part of a WPR analytic strategy is, therefore, clearly endorsed in 2009, 2012 and 2016, well before publication of the Zheng and Hardy article (2026). 

Danson (Zheng) explicitly asks Copilot to produce six WPR questions and so, predictably, six questions are produced. It would have been interesting to ask Copilot if it could introduce the WPR framework without specifying 6 questions. I use this example to indicate a larger point – that AI is constrained to deliver within the boundaries set by researchers, who are fallible and who are also positioned in situations where they may offer a partial perspective. We are told “Copilot responded with consistent interpretations of the theoretical underpinnings as the way Danson understood the approach” (Zheng and Hardy 2026, p. 7). A first step in considering the usefulness of the analysis produced, therefore, must involve some assessment of Danson’s (Zheng’s) understanding of WPR. Serious questions need to be asked about how such an assessment could be produced. 

“Self”-problematisation and WPR

My critical intervention here is not simply to point out that an omission occurred in describing the analytical framework (WPR), e.g. leaving out Process 7 or “self”-problematisation, but to stress the centrality of “self”-problematisation to WPR and to possible collaborations with Copilot. Indeed, I will suggest that leaving out “self”-problematisation works at cross-purposes with the declared intent in Zheng and Hardy to uncover one’s deep-seated assumptions – which surely is the goal of “self”-problematisation. Hence, by omitting “self”-problematisation, the authors miss exactly what they are looking for. Let us take a closer look at this dynamic.

Zheng and Hardy (2026) are particularly concerned with Question 4 in WPR (see above and Bacchi 2026, p. 24). The authors explain that, before collaborating with Copilot, “Danson had conducted a preliminary human version of the chosen policy” (Zheng and Hardy 2026, p. 6; emphasis in original). Danson was concerned that he was being a “passive ‘follower’ of the policy as constituted” (p. 6). The authors note: “The fourth analytical question from the WPR approach, in particular, was proving challenging”:

“Consequently, to think beyond what was thinkable to him at the time, Danson thus became motivated to work with a non-human partner to ‘more deeply’ analyse the policy. Upon choosing the GenAI partner, Copilot, Danson conducted an exploratory post-qualitative collaborative policy analysis. (p. 6)”

The authors state clearly that “Question Four” in WPR motivated Danson to take on the collaboration. They specify in relation to Question 4:

“This is not an easy question, as it challenged Danson to think about what is silenced or unproblematic in the policy. By the time of the collaboration, Danson was uncertain about the analysis he had derived for this particular analytical question in his preliminary ‘human version’ of analysis with the WPR approach. (p. 7)”            

Danson conducts a kind of critical interrogation with Copilot, looking to better understand Queston 4. The authors produce the methodological steps taken by Danson in collaboration with Copilot to “reflect on how Copilot’s responses prompted Danson to think differently” and I refer you to page 8 of the article for details (we pursue the question of language and translation in the last section). The primary insight generated through this 

“richly collaborative intra-active series of analytical conversation challenged Dansen to reflect on how his thinking was strongly regulated by policy discourses within the Chinese policy context and to re-examine his ways of knowing and being in relation to language use and research engagement. (p. 8; emphasis added)”

You may recognise here stated goals that align with “self”-problematisation –  “subjecting the grounding assumptions in one’s own problem representations to critical scrutiny” (see above), which unfortunately disappears from the WPR framework in this account. 

Zheng and Hardy are certainly correct that Question 4 is challenging. In past publications I consider a range of research strategies for engaging this question. 

These include: 

• Working with comparative analysis
• Reading the critical literature 
• Exploring WPR as a group exercise (including cross-disciplinary contributions or “lay” “experience”). (Bacchi 2026, p. 22; Research Hub entry 29 Jan 2026)

The question prompted by Zheng and Hardy’s innovative approach, I suggest, is: could generative AI operate as one possible way of disrupting taken-for-granted “truths” and raising alternative problematisations? Could GenAI assist with Question 4? I see promise for this suggestion largely through the practice of translation. 

Copilot and translation

The publication of articles/chapters using WPR in languages other than English has consistently produced a stumbling block for me. There are some languages where, I believe, even the question – “What’s the problem represented to be?”- makes little sense. Clearly AI has tremendous translation skills that could assist with this situation.

Zheng and Harding provide an excellent example of the role played by translation in their interrogation of the selected Chinese education document. To understand how they proceed I need to supply some detail: 

“This first lightbulb moment also became possible due to the translation between two languages by Copilot. In this collaboration, Danson communicated with Copilot for collaborative policy analysis in English. As the policy is written in Mandarin Chinese, Copilot’s effective processing of the language patterns inevitably involved a translation process. This translation process by Copilot brought unexpected benefits through disassembling/disrupting the Chinese language patterns that Danson initially ‘took for granted’. (p. 8)”

I refer you to the article for additional explanation. The authors conclude that: “GenAI’s capability in deconstructing and reconstructing language patterns, then, disrupted the discursive relations and opened up the possibility for the human researcher, Danson in this study, to think differently” (p. 9).

The goal of “thinking differently” runs as a dominant theme in Zheng and Hardy. The article title highlights this focus: “Thinking the unthinkable: Generative AI for collaborative, intra-active policy analysis”. And thinking differently is certainly one objective of Question 4 in WPR. If GenAI prompts researchers to think differently, engaging with GenAI seems to be a worthwhile project. The example of translation indicates how this outcome can be achieved. 

Conclusion

Zheng and Hardy open up the question of “engagement” between human and non-human subjects (AI) in stimulating ways. They change the tone of most work on this topic where the major ethical concerns include: plagiarism, integrity, fabrication and misinformation (p. 2). Challenging the argument that qualitative research should be a distinct human practice, they support “a more ‘ethical’, intra-active way of engaging with GenAI by acknowledging both humans’ and GenAI’s capabilities”. 

With all this, I struggle to see how GenAI would engage with “self”-problematisation, a central premise in WPR and the grounds of its ethical commitment. It would be useful to test GenAI by asking it to perform a WPR analysis of a selected policy document once one had confirmed that GenAI accepts the full list of questions and modes of analysis endorsed in 2009, 2012, 2016 and more recently (Bacchi and Goodwin 2025, Bacchi 2026) – i.e. including “self”-problematisation. Specifically, it would open up this conversation to important new dimensions to see if a “reflexive” GenAI is feasible and what this could look like. I take the topic further in the next entry. 

References

Bacchi C. 2009. Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to Be? Pearson Education. 

Bacchi C. 2012. Introducing the ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ approach. In: Bletsas A and Beasley C (eds) Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic Interventions and Exchanges. The University of Adelaide Press, pp.21–24. 

Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge. 

Bacchi, C. and Goodwin, S. 2016. Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice. Second edition 2025. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zheng, D. and Hardy, I. 2026. “Thinking the unthinkable: Generative AI for collaborative, intra-active policy analysis”. Methodological Innovations,

https://doi.org/10.1177/20597991261448572