Do we need another article or commentary on the meaning of populism? Lord, no! My research on this topic suggests that theoretical contributions are beginning to repeat themselves. Hence, I take a different starting point. I ask: “What’s at stake in how we think about populism?”. The title for the entry indicates the perspective I develop – my concerns about the overuse of “populism” and about the political implications of different characterisations and definitions. 

This entry was prompted by the frequent use of the term “populism” in contemporary politics and political analysis. I found myself wanting some guidance on the phenomenon. In addition, I wanted to see if WPR thinking (Research Hub entry 28 Dec 2025) could assist with this task. 

This entry will be the first of three contributions on the topic. It probes some of the definitional debates around “populism”. The next entry applies the WPR approach to important theoretical propositions about populism, including the “ideational” approach (Mudde 2017) and post-foundational contributions (e.g. Laclau 2005). These are preliminary investigations which, I hope, may stimulate interest on this vitally important topic and prompt additional research. 

“Defining” “populism” 

When theorists engage with the topic of “populism” they tend to adopt one of two different strategies: offering a definition or, bypassing definitions, to offer characterisations – lists of characteristics or principles. In this entry we pursue the first of these approaches. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) offer the best-known definition:  

A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale (general will) of the people.

In a survey of the extensive literature on populism, Mansbridge and Macedo (2019, p. 60) conclude that “the only core elements – in both theory and practice – are ‘pitting the people in moral battle against elites’” (Meyer 2023, p. 847; emphasis in original).

A poststructuralist framework, such as WPR, encourages us to think about how definitions, such as the one just offered, constitute problematisations. Providing definitions is considered to be a limiting exercise. Mol et al. (2010) describe how, if you define what an apple is, you are henceforth constrained to see as apples only those things that match that definition. It follows that, if we accept Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition of “populism”, we can only see political developments that match that characterisation. 

A more critical approach would ask how that definition represents the “problem” of “populism” (see Question 5 in WPR, Bacchi 2026, pp. 22-24). The thinking here follows Andersen’s (2003) work on the theoretical usefulness of second-order observation. This analytic strategy suggests that much is to be gained by refusing to reduce an observation to something else (for example, an ideology) and, instead, to produce an observation of an observation (Andersen 2003; Goodwin 2010). I will be offering observations of the Mudde and Kaltwasser observation (definition), focusing specifically on the distinction commonly drawn between “left-wing” and “right-wing” “populisms”. 

Where do definitions lead?

The Mudde and Kaltwasser definition produces “populism” as a singular phenomenon. “Populism” operates as a “catch-all label for political platforms or movements that challenge the political order, drawing on the “elite” versus “people” dichotomy” (Müller 2025, p. 19). In this tradition the analysis becomes about “populism” pure and simple (Head and Banerjee 2020), or there are broad generalisations such as “in populist times” (Meyer 2024, p. 847) or “populist political orientation” (Štětka et al. 2025, p. 1039). Judis (2016) describes populism as “occurring independently of political leanings” (in Meyenburg 2025). 

Within the broad category of “populism” Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) argue that “left-wing populism is much more inclusionary and socio-economically egalitarian than its right-wing counterpart” (in Meyenburg 2025, p. 1088). We have here distinctions drawn within a general phenomenon, thus retaining the broad category “populism”. 

Müller (2025, p.19) contends that such a “loose conception” of “populism” is overinclusive. He sees the people/elite dichotomy as rhetorics that “obscure important differences between political ideologies”: 

“They tend to lump together distinct political platforms – such as left- and right-wing parties – which not only have very different historical roots but also adhere to fundamentally different set (sic) of normative and epistemological premises.”

Müller suggests that we need closer examination of specific political perspectives. Drawing attention to “elites” and “corruption” cannot, on its own, constitute “populism”.  

“As noted by political economist László Andor (2020: 24), even green and liberal parties in developing countries occasionally employ this rhetoric to combat entrenched elite corruption.”

Wilder (2026) agrees. He notes how the common tendency to refer to “populism” as embracing “left-wing” and “right-wing” versions has a range of concerning political effects. Such an approach, he argues, leads to the characterisation of all “populist” leaders as similar and as lacking in desirable traits.

 Bernie Sanders and Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez are treated as “left analogues of ultraright racist, xenophobic, militarized, antidemocratic, and fascistic politics that have become increasingly normalized in recent years”. 

Wilder recognises that “both currents” (“left” and “right”) challenge traditional elites, entrenched institutions, and certain liberal norms. “But”, he emphasises, “they are otherwise incommensurable” (emphasis added). Andor (2020, p. 22) is similarly critical of “heaping together various political qualities, e.g. the far right and the radical left, which are otherwise arch enemies of each other” (emphasis added). 

Positing a “false equivalence” between “right” and “left” “populism” treats “insurgent politics [of all kinds] as intrinsically antidemocratic” (Wilder 2026). A general “taming” of political action and protest takes place – “civic virtue is identified with civility, compromise, and consensus” (Wilder 2026). 

To work against these effects, Wilder (2026) recommends leaving behind the common practice of referring to “left-wing” and “right-wing” “populism” and adopting Stuart Hall’s (1988a) distinction between “authoritarian populism” and “popular democracy”. Wilder elaborates: 

“I thus break with the common tendency to regard authoritarianism as one form that populism may assume. Rather, I suggest that we recognize populism as one form that authoritarianism may assume.” 

In this suggestion, “populism” becomes a secondary term and our political analysis targets authoritarian political practices. Mudde (in Petersen 2013; emphasis added) also recommends that far-right parties should be called “populist radical right” as opposed to “radical right populist”, as the latter would put the emphasis on populism (a secondary characteristic) away from radical right (which Mudde argued was the core of the ideology). Following this argument, I would prefer that we talk about “populist authoritarianism” rather then “authoritarian populism”. 

Wilder’s political evaluation goes further. He follows Stuart Hall’s (1988b, p. 56 in Wilder) analysis of the rise of Thatcher with the proposition that “the right is what it is partly because of what the left is”. In looking to explain the rise of “right-wing populism”, he challenges “liberalism’s refusal to recognize the manifold ways that its own assumptions, politics, contradictions, and impasses are implicated in the rise of authoritarian populism, insofar as it helped to create its conditions of possibility” (see Research Hub entry on Authoritarian Governmentality 28 Sept 2025). In this explanation, “a contradictory liberalism nourishes authoritarian populism that in turn serves as an alibi for more liberalism”. There is clearly a lot at stake in our theoretical choices. 

Returning to the question of definitions, producing a term “populism” invokes its opposite, “not populism”. Such a distinction makes it difficult to analyse the terrain between the two and hence overlaps in political developments. The targeting of “populism”, for example, allows political leaders to rule in ways that are meant to keep “the populists” at bay:

Blanket anti-populism today opens the door to Macron-ism (i.e. a belief that progressives are supposed to integrate into a broad, pro-European, but essentially technocratic tent, and that staving off the far right requires dropping the social agenda. (Andor 2020, p. 26; emphasis added).

Indicatively, Hillary Clinton (2018) cautioned European leaders to “curb immigration to stop right-wing populists”. On this point we need to watch Tony Burke’s much anticipated announcement on immigration. 

 “Populism” as euphemism?

When we adopt a euphemism, the intent is to “soften” the message, to make it more palatable to more people. So, we talk about “passing away” instead of “dying”. If we are concerned about authoritarian developments in diverse political settings worldwide, it may be wise to avoid the euphemism “populism” for such developments. Andor (2020, p. 26) makes the point clearly: 

While not at all irrelevant as a concept, the overuse of populism today is a sign of intellectual laziness and a substitute for proper political analysis. It has never properly been explained why nationalist, authoritarian, far right and neo-fascist tendencies should not be called nationalist, authoritarian, far right, or neo-fascist, but populist instead.

There are expressed attempts to win over “populism” for the left that deserve attention. We will be looking at Laclau (2005) next time. In an article titled “Green Populism? Action and mortality in the Anthropocene”, Davies (2019, Abstract) argues on behalf of “a less pejorative understanding of populism”. He expresses the hope that “we might be able to identify elements within that can be usefully channelled and mobilised towards the urgent rescue of human and non-human life”. He identifies a number of “left populists” who are “already positioning environmental issues as popular concerns”. Along similar lines, Agustín (2025, p. 73) pursues how “left-wing or progressive populism relates to environmental issues” and likewise speaks about “green populism”.

Meyer (2024) explains the context for these “green” interventions. He calls for “a more inclusive conception of populism and a more critical and plural account of expertise”. According to Meyer, what is at stake is competing worldviews. He mentions, for example, Indigenous ecological knowledge and citizen science, as ways of knowing that contest dominant forms of science and elite power (Meyer 2023, p. 846). Going further, he describes these ways of knowing as themselves “forms of expert knowledge”. In this way Meyer, along with Davies and Agustin, disrupt the core part of the definition of “populism” produced by Mudde and Kwalwasser (see above) that sets “the people” against “elites”. Whether or not it is possible to “reclaim” populism from the nationalists and neo-fascists identified by Andor (above) is up for debate.

Currently I find myself more concerned by the euphemistic adoption of “populism” (for neo-fascism, authoritarianism, etc.) than by the possibility of reclaiming the term. I would suggest that to an extent we are prisoners of the current political climate that makes “populism” a dangerous word. Reflecting on how definitions set the parameters for judging political developments, I also fear that we may see more and more “populisms” replacing thoughtful political analysis. 

With the “core elements” of “populism” identified as “pitting the people in moral battle against elites” (see above), where does this leave governmentality studies that raise critical questions regarding “expert knowledges” (Bacchi 2026, pp. 4, 15)? Will they fall within some broad “populist” branding? Or would appeals to the “voice” of the people and to “lived experience” as a form of knowledge be cast as a species of “populist” thinking because they appear to adopt a “people vs expert” framework? On this criterion, are we all “populists”? 

Conclusion

The point of this entry is to encourage a different approach to “populism” from conventional definitional approaches. It highlights the need to consider the political implications of our theoretical propositions (including our definitions). Mol’s (2002, p. 155; emphasis in original) argument about the political impact of “methods” sets the tone: “Methods are not a way of opening a window on the world, but a way of interfering with it. They act, they mediate between an object and its representation”.

Some strategies to manage overuse of the term “populism” could involve: (1) treating “populism” as a secondary characteristic, thereby focusing attention on the political agendas of so-called “populists”; (2) paying close attention to the repercussions of producing dichotomies (i.e. people vs elite; populism/not populism) in one’s analysis, considering what is left unsaid (see Question 4 in WPR, Bacchi 2026, pp. 22-24); and (3) following Andor (2020) placing emphasis on the substance rather than the style of “populism”, requiring “deep inquiry into historical background and economic foundations … to better understand nationalist and far-right tendencies and to develop more effective strategies against right-wing extremism in the name of humanity, equality and solidarity”. 

REFERENCES

Agustín, O. G. and Jerne, I. 2025. Green populism: Counterpublics and the formation of counterknowledge. In M. M. Roslyng, A. Rantasila, A. and A. M. Jönsson (eds) Communicating Science, Climate Change and the Environment in Hybrid Media, NY: Routledge.

Andersen, N. 2003. Discursive analytical strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau Luhmann. Bristol: Policy Press.

Andor, L. 2020. Against a General Theory of Populism: The Case of East-Central Europe. ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Forum, DOI: 10.1007/s10272-020-0864-6 

Bacchi, C. 2026. What’s the Problem Represented to be? A new thinking paradigm. NY: Routledge.

Clinton, H. 2018. The Guardian 23 November. 

Davies, W. 2020. Green Populism?: action and mortality in the anthropocene. Environmental Values, 29(6), 647–668. Retrieved from https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/27259/ 

Goodwin, S. 2010. Chapter 15: Analysing Policy as Discourse: Methodological Advances in Policy Analysis. In L. Markauskaite, P. Freebody and J. Irwin (eds) Methodological Choice and Design: Scholarship, Policy and Practice in Social and Educational Research, pp. 167-180.

Hall, S. 1988a. Authoritarian populism: a reply to Jessop. In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left. S. Hall, ed. pp. 115–124. London: Verso. 

Hall, S. 1988b. The great moving right show. In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the left. S. Hall, ed. Pp. 39–56. London: Verso. 

Head, B. W. & Subho Banerjee 2020. Policy expertise and use of evidence in a populist era, Australian Journal of Political Science, 55:1, 110-121, DOI: 10.1080/10361146.2019.1686117 

Judis, J. B. 2016. The Populist Explosion – How the Great Recession transformed American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports.

Laclau, E 2005. Populism: What’s in a name? In: Panizza F (ed.) Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. London: Verso, pp.32–49.

Mansbridge J and Macedo S 2019. Populism and Democratic Theory. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15 (1): 59–77. 

Meyenburg, I. 2025. Neoliberalism and Right-Wing Populism–A Love Story, Journal of Economic Issues, 59:4, 1084-1096, DOI: 10.1080/00213624.2025.2575146 

Meyer, J. M. 2024. Power and Truth in Science-Related Populism: Rethinking the Role of Knowledge and Expertise in Climate Politics. Political Studies 72(3): 845-861, DOI: 10.1177/00323217231160370.

Mol, A, Moser, I, Piras, EM, Turrini, M, Pols, J & Zanutto, A 2010, Care in practice: on normativity, concepts, and boundaries, Technoscienza, Italian Journal of Science and Technology Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 73–86. DOI: 10.6092/issn. 2038-3460/16996. 

Mol, A 2002, The body multiple: ontology in medical practice, Duke University Press, Durham, NC. 

Mudde, C. 2017. Populism: An ideational approach. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart PA, Espejo PO and Ostiguy P (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.27–47.

Mudde C and Kaltwasser C R 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Müller, J. F. 2025. An Epistemic Account of Populism. Episteme, 22, 1-22, doi:10.1017/epi.2023.39 

Petersen, M. 2013. Populism as a thought-defying cliché. Open Democracy, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/populism-as-thought-defying-cliche-2/. Referenced 30 April 2026.

Štětka, V. et al. 2025. Have people “had enough of experts”? The impact of populism and pandemic misinformation on institutional trust in comparative perspective, Information, Communication & Society, 28:6, 1039-1060, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2024.2413121 Wilder, G. 2026. Populism as Liberal Alibi: Recalling Stuart Hall’s Analysis of Thatcherism. Current Anthropology, 67, supplement 26, https://doi.org/10.1086/739791